in collecting the data in Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Gualemala, Cohen, 1982; Lerner & Lerner, 1981; Lind & Tyler, 1988;  Venezuela, Chile, and EI Salvador. Within these countries, we extend Mikula, 1980; Mowday, 1987; our 
Through General Distress
Most of the rare investigations of emotional reactions to injustice confined themselves to proving the existence of distress. Experimental studies, which typically use mood adjective check lists as an overall self-report measure of contentment versus distress, generally found that participants were more content (and less distressed) when they were equitably treated than when they were either underbenefited or overbenefited (e.g., Austin & Walster, 1974; Hassebrauck, 1991) . Similarly, nonexperimental studies of close, intimate relationships found more satisfaction for individuals who perceived their relationship as equitable rather than inequitable (see Sprecher & Schwartz, 1994 , for a review of this line of research).
The distress mediation hypothesis is supported by some evidence that the experience of injustice is accompanied by heightened physiological arousal. Markovsky (1988) found increased skin conductance responses (relative to baseline) among unjustly underpaid and overpaid participants. Hassebrauck (1991) obtained higher diastolic and systolic blood pressure for inequitably treated as compared to equitably treated participants. Neither study found heart rate differences between justly and unjustly treated participants.
Although some authors have questioned the necessity of postulating an ,emotional mediation for the cognitive and behavioral effects of injustice that have been observed (Greenberg, 1984; Rivera & Tedeschi, 1976; Sprecher, 1992; Tajfel, 1982) , the evidence cited in this article suggests a central motivational role for emotion. In fact, evidence from experimental misattribution studies (Hassebrauck, 1987 (Hassebrauck, , 1991 lends support to the proper sition that inequity distress is a necessary, (altho~gh not sufficient)-condition for reactions directed_at restoring equity to occur.
TM Nature of the Emotional Responses to Injustice
Although one fmds reports of specific emotions such as anger and guilt in response to experiencing injustice from the very beginning of the scientific interest in equity and justice (e.g., Adams, 1965; Adams & Freedman, 1976; Greenberg, 1984; Homans, 1961; Walster et al., 1978) , little systematic research has been devoted so far to the nature of the specific emotional reactions that accompany the experience of injustice. Some authors explored emotional reactions to injustice by means of role-playing vignette studies. Mikula (1986 Mikula ( , 1987 asked high school students to put themselves in one of five different scenarios of injustice in the school setting and to write down how they would feel and what would go through their minds in the situation. Six different categories of emotional responses emerged from participants' protocols (in order of decreasing frequency): (a) anger, rage, and indignation; (b) disappointment, feeling aggrieved; (c) surprise; (d) physical symptoms of arousal and stress; (e) helplessness, depression; and (f) envy.
A similar study by Clayton (1992; Study 2) found comparable results: Feelings of anger constituted the dominant emotional response. In addition, indications of feelings of sadness and disappointment occurred in the protocols. Hegtvedt (1990) used vignettes of businesslike exchange relations. She found that participants who placed themselves in the position of the underrewarded exchange partner reported more resentment and helplessness and less gratitude than equitably rewarded andoverrewarded participants. Participants who role-played the overrewarded partner reported slightly more guilt than participants in the other reward conditions. Finally, Sprecher (1992) Other studies focused on naturally occurring experiences of injustice. Mikula (1986 Mikula ( , 1987 asked participants to report an even t in which they had been unjustly treated by another person and~to describe their thoughts, feelings, and bellaVlolSilreactions. The categories of emotions that were distinguished in this exploratory study correspond with those observed in the roleplaying study previously described (again in order of inson & Manstead, 1992; Reisenzein & Hofmann, 1990 Roseman, Spindel, &Jose, 1990; Scherer, 1988, for reviews) .
The work reported in this article is based on the appraisal theory proposed by Scherer (1984 Scherer ( , 1986 in the context of a comprehensive component process model of emotion. The theory postulates that the elicitation, and the consequent differentiation, of the emotion episode is determined by the results of appraising the antecedent situation with respect to a series of five major stimulus evaluation checks (SECs): novelty/suddenness, intrinsic pleasantness, goal conduciveness, coping ability, and compatibility with standards.
Although some appraisal theorists have mentioned criteria that might imply the perception of injustice, such as legitimacy (Roseman, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) , value relevance (Frijda, 1986) , or approval and blameworthiness (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988) , injustice or unfairness are rarely mentioned explicitly by appraisal theorists (but, see Beck, 1967; Epstein, 1984) . In early versions of his component process model, Scherer (1981 Scherer ( ,1984 included unfairness as one of the stimulus evaluation checks in addition to the more general notion of compatibility with external standards or norms (which captures the normative or legitimacy aspect). In later versions of the model, Scherer (1986 Scherer ( , 1988 subsumed, wielding Occam's razor, this check under the more general heading of compatibility with external standards, presuming that one could think of justice norms in similar ways to other kinds of norms.
Thus, the neglect of injustice as an emotion-antecedent appraisal dimension in its own right has led to a dearth of empirical data with respect to this appraisaldimension and its effect on the types of emotions elicited as well as the nature of the ensuing affective reactions. The cross-cultural study that is at the basis of this article was conceived by Scherer a..'1.dhis collaborators before the stimulus evaluation check of perceived injustice or unfairness was subsumed under a more general dimension in the theory, and consequently, a question related to this Much of theresear,ch cited previously, except for the appraisal check was included in the questionnaire.l work by Montada and his collaborators, has been conThis article reports the results from a large-scale cross---aueted wii:hin-ihe-wdl~efmea area-of jusiicenresearch---~-c\iltural stlldythafarEpeitiiientio~tfiisappiaisaIdiiiien:------with rather little cross-reference to emotion research. sion. These data are examined with the following quesHowever, just as justice researchers have tended to netions in mind: glect the emotion literature, emotion psychologists have 1. For which errwtions does appraisal of injustice or unfairrarely considered the work on emotional consequences ness constitute an important aspect of the emotion-antecedent of injustice .experiences. This neglect is particularly sali£vent evaluation pattern? Justice theories discuss anger and ent with respect to appraisal theories of emotion. These guilt as the most likely emotional responses to the percognitive theories attempt to predict the elicitation and ception of i~ustice, depending on whether the injustice differentiation of emotion on the basis of a limited is advantageous or disadvantageous to the respective number of dimensions, criteria, or evaluation checks perceiver (cf. Adams, 1965; Homans, 1961; Walster etal ., used in the appreciation of a situation or event (see 1978) . However, the research previously reviewed in this Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Manstead & Tetlock, 1989; Park- article suggests that the perception of injustice can elicit ?ecreasmg trequency): (a) anger, rage, and indignation; (b) disappointment, feeling aggrieved; (c) surprise; (d) physical symptoms of arousal and stress; and (e) helplessness, depression. Sprecher (1986) conducted a survey study with students who wereinvolved in close heterosexual relationships. Participants were asked to assess the inequity of their relationship and indicate the degree to which they experienced each of various positive and negative emotions in their relationship during the previous month. She found perceived inequity to be significantly related to a variety of positive ahd negative emotions experienced in the relationship. The negative emotions of anger, hate, resentment, hurt, sadness, frustration, and depression and the positive responses of happiness in the relationship and respect for the partner were among the specific emotions most strongly related to inequity.
The work ofMontada and his coworkers (e.g., Montada & Schneider, 1989; ReicWe & Montada, 1994) represents a further line of research dealing with injustice and emotions. In contrast to the research summarized earlier in this article, which mostly dealt with immediate emotional responses to perceived injustice, this group of researchers explores the interrelations between cognitive appraisals, attributions, and emotional reactions. Combining elements of justice theory and cognitive emotion theory, they focus in particular on the mediating (and/or moderating) role of evaluations of injustice and attributions of responsibility in the elicitation of specific emotions, which, in turn, affect the way in which people experience and cope with a given situation. The approach has been applied to settings such as coping with victimization and negative life events , confrontations with the situation of disadvan-taged members of human society (Montada & Schneider, 1989) , and experience of restrictions and losses by first-time parents (Reichle & Montada, 1994 injustice as an instance of inconsistency, dissonance, or refutation of existing expectations that elicits some kind of distress in the perceiver. Theory and research point to a wide range of possible consequences of injustice that should be reflected in the. appraisal of the situation (e.g., Adams, 1965; Mikula, 1984; Reis, 1984; Walster et al., 1978) . According to this body of knowledge, unjust situations can be expected to be appraised, among other things, as less expected, more aversive or unpleasant, more of a hindrance to goal achievement, and more detrimental to the self-concept, as compared with situations that are not regarded as unjust.
3. Is the nature of the affective reaction (Ph) 'siology, expression, behavior) Sampson, 1975) . In fact, cross-cultural comparisons have typically revealed cultural differences (e.g., Berman & Murphy-Berman, 1996; Bond, Leung, & Wan, 1982; Bond, Leung, & Schwartz, 1992; Leung & Park, 1986; Murphy-Berman, Berman, Singh, Pachauri, & Kumar, 1984; Tornblom, Jonsson, & Foa, 1985) . However, because most of these studies have dealt with cultural differences in what is regarded as just and unjust, it is not clear whether cultural differences can also be expected with regard to subjective feeling and/or reaction characteristics once a situation has been perceived and labeled as unjust or unfair.
METIlODS

Background
This article reports a sub analysis of a large-scale data set that stems from a cross-cultural study of emotion-eliciting situations in 37 countries. A detailed description of the methodology used in this extensive study (conducted from 1984 to 1992) is provided by Scherer and Wallbott (1994) . In that article, issues such as the development of the pre coded questionnaire (based on the results for free.format questionnaires used in earlier studies; see Scherer, Wallbott, & Summerfield, 1986; Scherer, Wallbott, Matsumoto, & Kudoh, 1988) , the choice of emotions to be studied, the choice of emotion components investigated, the choice of countries included in the sample, translation and back-translation of the research materials, and participant characteristics are presented in ,great detaiL in an effort ,to save space, only factual information-that concerns methodological details of the research pr:ocedure are provided in this article.
0testionnaire Design
The questionnaire consisted of a one~page general -instrlicuorraIiClseveii-iWO:page sections, one foreach-()fthe seven emotions studied Goy, anger, fear, sadness, disgust, shame, and guilt). The instruction sheet asked the respondent to recall a situation in which he or she had recently experienced a strong emotion of the kind indicated and for which they vividly remembered the circumstances and their reactions. They were assured of total anonymity and asked to reply to each of the questions with respect to the situation and the emotional experience .generated by the latter. Finally, an example was provided for the circling of the response alternatives. ThetWo;page questionnaire section for each of the seven emotions consisted of four partS: «a) situation description; (b) subjective feeling state;,(c)2'physioIQgical symptoms, expre'Ssive behavior;aild"6ther reactions; and (d) appraisal. Because the free-form situation descriptions have not yet been analyzed, this article reports results separately for situation antecedent appraisals and for
. emotional responses, combining subjective feeling and physiological and expressive reactions.2
APPRAISAL QUESTIONS
Nine questions concerning novelty/expectation, intrinsic pleasantness, goal conduciveness, fairness, responsibility / causation, coping ability, immorality, and relationship to self-concept (see Scherer, 1984) were posed (with precoded answer alternatives appropriate to the question concerned).
The choice and the formulation of these questions were a compromise be~een {a) attempting to represent as many checks and subchecks of the SEC model as possible and (b) having to keep the questionnaire relatively short and to express the SECs in a simple, straightforward manner. The detailed wording of the questions and the answer alternatives (in the form in which they were coded for statistical analysis) are listed below in the order in which they appeared in the questionnaire.
The SECs or subchecks that were operationalized by each question are shown in brackets before the text of the question. The variable names used throughout the article are in parentheses after the text of the question. In several cases, the terms used as variable names deviate somewhat from the terms used for the theoretical SECs in such a way as to clearly indicate the direction of the answer categories in their formulation.
Respondents were asked to think back to the situation or event that caused the specific emotion.
Did you expect this simation to
Did you find the event itself pleasant or unpleasant?
How important was the event for your goals, needs, or desires at the time it happened? Did it help or hinder you to follow yourplaus or to achieve your aims? < 1= it.helPed, 2 = it didn't matter, 3 = it hindered) (goal hindrance) [compatibility with external standards: fairness]: Would you say that the situation or event that.caused your emotion was unjust or unfair? (1 = not at al~2 = a little, How did you evaluate your ability to act on or to cope with the event and its consequences when you were first confronted with this situation? Check one, the most appropriate, of the following (5 categories were reordered as 1 = powerless, 2 = escape possible, 3 = pretend nothing happened, 4 = no action necessary; 5= could positively influence event and change consequences In addition to the answer alternatives listed, responden ts could check the category "not applicable" for each of the questions. This answer alternative was included to enable participants to respond to appraisal questions that they considered to be irrelevant to the situation concerned.
However, the possibility that respondents also checked this alternative for other reasons (e.g., in the sense of don't know or don 't remember)cannot be ruled out.
QUESTIONS ABOUT SUBJECTIVE FEEliNG AND REACTIONS
With respect to feeling, respondents were asked to indicate its duration (l =few minutes, 2 = an hour, 3 = several hours, 4 = a day or more) and intensity (1 = not very, 2 = moderately, 3 = intense, 4 = very intense) .
With respect to reactions, separate checklists were provided for .(a) 11 bodily symptoms (lump in throat, change in breathing, stomach troubles, feeling cold/shivering, feeling warm/pleasant, feeling hot/ cheeks burning, heart beating faster, muscles tensing/ trembling, muscles relaxing/restful, perspiring/moist hands, other symptoms), (b) 11 nonverbal expressive behaviors (laughing/smiling, crying/sobbing, other changes in facial expression, screaming/yelling, other changes in voice, change in gesturing, abrupt bodily movements, moving toward people or things, withdrawing from people or things, moving against people or things/aggression, other expressive reactions), and (c) 8 types of verbal behavioT'{silence, short utterance, one or 1:\"°sentences, 'lengthy utterance, 'speech-melody change, speech disturbances, speech tempo changes, other verbal behavior). The respondent was asked to check each symptom or reaction experienced in the situation. In each case, a "special category for do not rememberwas provided.
. To allow theuse-ofparametri<='statistical techniques,~~----responses were recoded. This was particularly necessary for the symptom and reaction checklists. Recoding was performed by counting the number of symptoms or reactions mentioned by a respondent for each of a number of categories that had been formed on the basis of theoretical considerations \s~e below). In this manner, scales approaching interval.character from O{ none of the respective items mentioned) to n (maximal number of relevant items mentioned) were con"structed. The following scales were thus formed.
Physiological Symptoms. The distinction between the aotivation of the sym,pathetic versus the parasympathetic~-~-PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN i I \ branches of the autonomous nervous system (ANS) was used to group the reported symptoms according to the relevant psychophysiological literature. Sympathetic symptoms (scores 0 to 4) include change in breathing, heart beating faster, muscles tensing/trembling, and perspiring/moist hands. Parasympathetic symptoms (scores 0 to 3) include lump in throat, stomach troubles, and crying/sobbing.
Felt temperature (scores -1 to +2) includes feeling cold/shivering, feeling warm/pleasant, and feeling hot/cheeks burning (0 was assigned when no temperature symptom was mentioned).
Expressive Behavior. Four composite variables were formed: (a) movement behavior (scores -1 to + 1): withdrawing (-1) versus moving toward (+1) people and things (0 being assigned when no movement category was mentioned) (The item labeled "moving against people and things, aggression" was not included in coding movement behavior.); (b) nonverbal behavior (scores 0 to 6): laughing/smiling, crying/sobbing, other facial expression changes, screaming/yelling, other voice changes, and changes in gesturing; (c) paralinguistic behavior (scores 0 to 3): speech-melody changes, speech disturbances, and speech tempo changes; and (d) verbal behavior: a scale approaching interval character was formed by recoding the category checked into either 1 = short utterance, 2 = one or two sentences, or 3 = lengthy utterance.
Finally, the respondent was asked to indicate whether he or she tried to control or hide the feeling (control attempt: 1 = not at all, 2 =a little, and 3 =very much; not applicable was also included) and whether the event changed relationships with other people (relationship effects: 1 = negatively, 2 = not at all, 3 = positively; not applicable was also included).
QUESTIONNAIREFORMAT he-sequence-of the seven targef emotions was -randomized over respondents to control for or-der effects. At the end of the booklet, respondents were asked to complete a personal background questionnaire that contained questions concerning gender, age, field of study, religion, language, country of origin, and parents' education and occupation. Because these background variables did not correlate with other variables in the study to any significant extent, no results for these variables will be reported.
SamPling of Countries
The aim was to study a sufficiently large number of rather diverse countries to obtain a representative sampling of culture differences. Because this research was conducted essentially without any external funds, a convenience sample of countries was obtained by contacting colleagues in different countries who were interested and able to participate in the study without funding.
Translation of the Qp.estionnaire
The pragmatic type of translation (Brislin, 1980) was used, emphasizing the accuracy of the information intended to be conveyed in the source language form (in this case, English). The emotion questionnaire was translated into the language spoken in each of the participating countries by the local collaborator and his or her associates. Collaborators received the original English version as a model, together with detailed instructions concerning the translation process, particularly the procedures to follow for back-translation.
The principal investigators checked a large number of these translations and back-translations but were obviously unable to verifY the accuracy in all cases, particularly in the case of more exotic languages. There can be little doubt that the translations, especially of the emotion labels, do not ensure complete overlap with respect to denotative and particularly connotative meaning in all the languages studied. To the extent that there are differences, this would increase error variance. However, a systematic check of the concrete situation descriptions (which were translated into English and returned to the investigators along with the quantitative data from most countries) showed that no major translation problems were encountered.
SamPling of Participants
Given the large number ofcuitures studied, it was decided for reasons of comparability and of practicability that groups of students in major city universities were to be used as participants.
As a consequence, the generalizability of the data to be reported is limited to modern mass societies. The choice of respondent populations-=-____-also implies--a--fairly-high-degree of Westernization in many of the countries studied, which may reduce the chances of finding cultural differences (see Scherer & Wallbott. 1994 , for a more detailed discussion of this important point).
The collaborators in each of the sites were asked to recruit about 100 students, about half male and half female. In addition, they were to attempt to obtain, whenever possible, about 50% psychology students and 50% nonpsychology students from different fields of study. Foreign students were to be excluded as much as possible and age range constraints (18 to 35 years) were to be observed. These criteria wer-e also used in the final data analysis t~.e~c~u~e all cases that did not fit these constraints. In total, 2,921 respondents were 'retained m-;'cthe data set (55% women, 45% men), with a mean age of 21.8 years. Of the respondents, 43% were psychology students, whereas the rest were studying a variety of other disciplines (see Scherer & Wallbott, 1994 
Administration, Coding, and Analysis of the Q}testionnaire
The questionnaire was administered to groups of students in class, under conditions that would guarantee complete anonymity to each respondent. The collaborators and their associates in each of the participating countries transferred the data from the questionnaires to data coding sheets and translated the text of the situation descriptions into English. Data processing and analysis were performed at the University of Geneva, the University of Giessen, and the University of Graz.
RESULTS
Analysis of the Not Applicable &sponses
As described previously, respondents could replywith "not applicable" to the appraisal questions in order not to force them to apply the suggested criteria to the situation in question. This answer category was selected for 16.3% of all responses. Although these were approximately evenly distributed over the 7 emotions, there were systematic differences for the SECs (see Scherer, 1997) , including above average use of the category for unfairness (28.1 %) and immorality (30.1 %), except in the case of anger. Although the use of a not applicable response is interesting in its own right, this answer <:ategory poses problems with respect to the analysis of the main data set. It cannot be integrated into the interval scale format that is used for the responses on the different dimensions, and thus, it must be treated as a missing observation. Although this has little effect on univariate analyses, it is rather inconvenient in multivariate analyses that involve list-wise exclusion of cases with missingobservations. In this case, it does result in a serious redu<:tion of the numbec of respondents used in the study. To avoid this problem for the multivariate analyses reported below, the not applicable answers were replaced by the respective cell mean for that variable .(see Scherer, 1997 , for further justification). This was not done in the case_of univariate analyses.
Incidence of Injustice Appraisal for Different Kinds of Emotions
Our first question concerns the extent to which participants regarded the situations or events that caused the different emotions as unjust or unfair. The results are shown in Figure 1 . A one-way repeated-measures ANOVAfor unfairness over the seven-emotions showed highly significant differences, F{6, 17520) = 1651.8, P < .00001. As one might expect, there is very little injustice appraisal for the one positiv.e emotion (joy), and one could argue that the significance is due to the difference between joy and the negative emotions. However, an ANOVA with 6 levels, confined to negative emotions, still yielded a highly significant Fvalue, F{5, 14600) = 609.9, P < .0001. As the figure shows, anger-producing events were most frequently perceived as unfair or unjust, followed by disgust, sadness, and fear, and, with somewhat lower values, shame and guilt.
Given the very low percentage of injustice appraisals in the case of joy, any further analyses are likely to be biased due to the very skewed distribution of the injustice values for this variable. Therefore, in what follows, we eliminated joy, and for the other questions, we analyzed the data only with respect to the remaining six negative emotions.
Relations Between Perceived Injustice and Other Appraisal Variables
Our second question concerned the way in which the appraisal of an event as unjust correlates with other appraisal variables. In other words, do events considered as unjust exhibit specific appraisal profiles, differing from situations in which perceived injustice plays less of a role? The analysis <:hosen for this purpose was a separate A1'lOVA for each emotion, using injustice ratings as a grouping _variablc_(i.e.,_examining diffeJ::enc~s in th~.-other appraisal variables between respondents having described the situation as not unfair or unjust, a little unfair or unjust, or very unfair or unjust). In addition, the proportion of the variance due to a linear trend in the group means from not unjust to very unjust was computed. Table 1 shows the data for this kind of analysis for the emotion labeled as anger (which showed the strongest proportion of injustice appraisals). The first three columns show the different means on the appraisal variables for the three groups of injustice assessment. For the main effe<:t of injustice, the effect size, 112,and p, the significance level associated with the respective Fare (The remaining two sets of two columns each show interaction effects with culture variables, to be discussed later in this article. These data and the results for the reaction variable are included in the same table for the sake of economy of presentation.)
The results show strong and highly significant unfair---ness main effects for goal hindrance and immorality and .-significaIlt but less powerful effects for expectedness, unpleasantness, external causation, and self-consistency. In each case, the proportion of variance due to the linear trend (.,2) accounts for close to the total amount of variance (,,2) explained by injustice. This indicates that linear increases in the degree of perceived injustice will tend to correspondingly increase the appraisal of other dimensions (at least within the range.studied here). Rather than providing tables equivalent to Table 1 for each of the seven emotions, the most important information, ,,2 and rwith their associated ps, is summarized for all emotions inTable 2. The results, ;Uthough often weaker than in the case. of anger, confirm the pattern of resul~Events perceived as unfair are seen as'nriitJimore goal hindering and immoral than events not seen as unfair. They are also perceived as significantly less expected, more unpleasant, and more externally caused. Coping ability and self-consistency, although still showing significant effects, are less strongly associated with unfairness ratings.
Perceived Injustia; and &action Characteristics
The third question posed previously in this article concerns the relations between injustice appraisal and subjective, inotoi.:expressive,-pliysrOlogicaI~-ana~'oaiav---------ioral reactions. Given the strong emotional responses to perceived injustice reported in the literature, one might hypothesize that goal-discrepant events would provoke stronger emotional reactions if perceived as unfair. The lower part of Table 1 shows the reaction data in detail for the emotion of anger; the lower part~ofTable 2 contains the essential information (,,2 and r) for all emotions. Focusing on effect size, the pattern of Fesults is rather clear: There is a significant link of perceived injustice with the intensity of the subjective feeling experienced for all of the emotions studied. The .effect size for this variable attains about 5%o(the variance on average, which is remarkable ,given .the nature and size of the sample and the myriad ofaefeiininants and individual difference factors. A comparable, slightly weaker relationship is found between perceived injustice and dura-T tion. This latter effect might be partly due to a positive correlation between intensity and duration. However, the average T between these variables across all seven emotions only attains a value of .35, suggesting an independent association between injustice and duration. Thus, events appraised as unjust are subjectively experienced as significantly more intense and oflonger duration.
In comparison to the relation between perceived injustice and subjective feeling, the data for motor-expressive, physiological, and behavioral reactions are less impressive. Although many of the effects do attain significance at the p < .0001 level, the effect sizes are much lower than those for the feeling variables. Only the frequency of sympathetic physiological symptoms shows -a_some~hat stabl<,:_-effect size of I % ac_r9ss_~~m<:>!i~ns except shame, with somewhat elevated effects for sadness and disgust. Another major effect is found for the effects on relationships, attaining about 4% of the variance across all emotions. The more that the event was perceived as unjust, the more negative the effects on relationships with pertinent individuals were judged to be.
As in the case of the appraisal variables, comparisons between the columns for '112and r in Table 2 show that many of the reported effects are due to the linear trend from not unfair to very unfair, suggesting a linear relationship between the degree of perceived injustice and the intensity and duration of the resulting feeling, as well _as ilie quality of pertinent rdationsh!p~=" . ...
Is the Correlation Between Perceived Injustice and Emotional Reaction Independent of Other Appraisal Variables?
The following analyses relate to the question of whether the observed correlations between unfairness appraisal and the reaction variables of intensity, duration, and relationship effects are independent from or mediated by other appraisal variables associated with unfairness appraisal. Because sizable relationships of injustice with immorality, goal hindrance, and external causation were found (see above), this question is obviously quite pertinent.
Regression analysis was used to answer this question. Using the TEST option in the SPSS regression package, the unique contribution to the vari----ance explained in tllereactionvanaole iii questi6nmade~-by unfairness, immorality, and all other appraisal variables was determined (the value indicates the amoun t by which total If-would be reduced if the specific variable or block of variables were eliminated from the analysis). Relevant analyses were only -conducted for the three reaction variables that were significantly correlated with the unfairness appraisal and for the emotions of anger, sadness, and disgust, which, as reported above, were most strongly affected by unfairness appraisal. Table 3 shows the results of the a..'1.alyses.
The data in Table 3 , specifically in comparison to the --column in Table 2 showing T, show that, on the whole, the effects of pc:rc~:i~d injustice are independent of ==-c~7'"- other appraisal variables with the exception of immorality, in which there is some overlap in contributions to the explained variance (in other words, once immorality is introduced in the regression equation, the proportion of the variance due to unfairness is slightly reduced).
Cultural Differences
A further set of analyses explored the exten t to which cultural variations moderate justice-related evaluations of emotion-eliciting events and characteristics of emotional experiences.
Rather than studying potential differences between all 37 countries studied, we focused on two possible dimensions underlyin,g cross-country differences: (argeopolitical region'arid '(brvaIue orientations.
GEOPOliTICAL REGIONS
The categories chosen were (a) countries in northern and central Europe, (b) cpuntries around the Mediterranean basin, (c) Anglo-American New World countries, (d) Latin American countries, (e) Asian countries, and (f) African countries. Although much of this classification is based on geographical vicinity, political and historical factors related to the regional spread of common cultural elements and the historical pattern of Western influence are also ,considered. Although this classification is proposed here in an ad.hoc fashion, without precise criteria or justifications being offered, it is felt that this classification is of weater potential interest for hypothesis development and has greater face validity than a grouping on the basis of continents.
VALUE ORIENTATIONS
The data on country differences with respect to one of the m.yor dimensions of value orientation, individualismcollectivism (the relative importance of the family and other social groups as compared to emphasis on the rights and interests of the indiviclual), were obtained from the work of Hofstede (1980) . 3 In this article, we are not concerned with the main effects of these culture dimensions on either appraisal or reaction variables (see Scherer & Wallbott, 1994; Scherer, in press , for a more extensive analysis). Rather, the question concerns a possible interaction between the evaluation of injustice and cultural specificities in determining specific patterns of appraisal or emotional responding. In consequence, we repeated the ANOVAs reported above, separately for each emotion, adding one of the two culture dimensions as a s,econd grouping factor. The last two pairs of columns in Table 1 show the effect sizes for these interactions.
T,he data for anger show that the effect sizes for these interactions are negligible for both appraisal and reaction variables and, in many cases, are not significant. Because the effect sizes found for the other negative emotions are highly comparable in size, it was decided not to report these nonsignificant effects in detail. This pattern of results suggests that there are no culturespecific effects, at least with respect to the dimensions studied, on the correlations between attributed injustice and other appraisals and patterns of reactions.
DISCUSSION
The Role oj Injustice Appraisal Jor Different Kinds oj E71Wtions
One of the major questions posed in this study con-.cerned .the prevalence of evaluations of injustice or unfairness in the appraisal patterns of different types of emo tioIis-:This stUdy can be-in tetprete~das~Creplicatiori'~'--of earlier work, reviewed in the introduction, using a different paradigIIl. In the earlier studies, participants were presented with vignettes or asked to remember a situation in which they had been treated unjustly and then to indicate their emotional reaction. In this study, the targets to be remembered were specific emotional experiences. The task then consisted in describing (a) different aspects of situational appraisal, including perceived unfairness, and (b) different aspects of emotional reaction. The present results replicate the earlier findings. Anger is by far the most likely emotional reaction to events perceived as very unjust, followed by dis~st as the second most likely affective reaction. However, the results of this study show that-in a sizable proportionof all cases studied-sadness, fear, guilt, and shame are also possible consequences of perceived injustice. Interpretation of the findings is impeded by the fact that our analyses do not distinguish between advanta-'geous and disadvantageous forms of injustice orwheth'er the person experiencing the emotion confronted the unfair situation from the perspective of perpetrator, victim, or unaffected observer of injustice. No questions relevant to these issues were included because the appraisal of injustice was not the focus of the cross-cultural study of 'emotion-eliciting situations and the questionnaire had to be kept as short as possible. Pertinent information'
can be obtained by conducting careful qualitative analyses of the concrete situations reported by the participants. However, given the large number of descriptions of emotion-eliciting situations (about 20,000), systematic content analyses, necessitating the development of appropriate coding systems, were beyond the possibilities of this study.4 Thus, our interpretations necessarily remain to some extent speculative.
The emotions of anger, disgust, and sadness clearly refer to emotional responses of disadvantaged victims or unaffected observers of injustice. The term disgust seems to have been generalized from physical to moral matters, bordering onwhat might better be called contempt. In the cases in which shame or guilt were experienced following a perception of injustice, this may be due to the respondent having acted in an unfair manner or else having reacted to unfair treatment in a shameful manner. The situation is less clear with regard to the emotion of fear, which can be reasonably experienced by both disadvantaged victims and advantaged perpetrators of injustice, albeit for different reasons.
The predominance of anger, disgust, and sadness among the situations, which were regarded as very unjust, can mean different things. This could follow ITom ,the fact that there were more disadvantageous unjust situations in the participants' past than advantageous ones. Nternatively, instances of disadvantageous injustice may be more salient and accessible than advantageous ones. It couid also indicate that there are different -thresholdscfor disadvantageous-and'advantageous injustice, as has been suggested by some authors (Adams, 1965; Romans, 1961) . We cannot decide between these different possibilities, which are in any case not mutually exclusive. However, the observed predominance of anger, disgust, and sadness agrees with the evidence of other studies that reports that experiences of injustice refer more frequently-to situations in which the persons concerned suffered as a' result of, rather than derived advantage ITom, the' injustice (Lipkus, 1992; MikuJa, 1986 MikuJa, , 1987 Mikula, Petri, & Tanzer, 1990) . The conclusion suggested by these findings is that perceived unfairness or injustice is an important dimension in emotion-antecedent appraisal. Thus, rather than starting from the assumption that prototypical unfairness situations produce certain emotional reactions, one couldconceptualize perceived unfairness or injustice as one of several appraisal dimensions. In this conceptualization, perceived injustice would have a moderating influence. In other words, although perceived injustice may increase the likelihood of an anger reaction in terms of an a priori response tendency, the exact nature of the emotional reaction would be determined by the combined outcome of the appraisal on several dimensionssuch as the pertinence of the consequences, the perceived causal agent, the estimated coping ability, and so forth. For example, if the effect of someone's action, perceived as unfair, is a threat that is seen as difficult or impossible to avoid or to control, fear rather than anger is the likely response.
IntmTelations Between Perceived Injustice and Other Appraisal Variables
The data in this study show that, as one might expect, the appraisal dimensions are not independent of one another. The correlations between unfairness and the other appraisal variables correspond well to predictions derived from justice theory and research. The relationships of unfairness to the dimensions of goal hindrance, external causation, and immorality deserve to be discussed in more detail. The link to goal obstructiveness is interesting. Although all negative emotions have goal obstructiveness as a more or less prominent component of the antecedent appraisal process, it seems that the evaluation of injustice is linked to a particularly strong appraisal of goal hindrance.
One possibility is that the added evaluation of injustice makes the blocking of the goal more salient or pertinent.
Alternatively, being treated fairly might be a goal in itself, which is violated in addition to the ongoing need, goal, or plan being blocked (see Tyler & Lind, 1992) . The interpretation of the relationship to external causation is rather straightforward-in many cases, the judgment of injustice may be conditional on the ability to assign agency to an external factor,-particularly-a-cperson~or-a-'group.
Al----though a person may feel that they behave unfairly or that fate is unfair, most unfairness appraisals are probably conditioned by assigning the responsibility for a consequence to someone else (see Mikula, 1993; Montada, 1991) . The link between perceived injustice and immorality also,deserves attention. The con:elation between these two variables was generally stronger than the -correlations between injustice and other appraisal <ii-mensions. Inoaddition, the regression analyses revealed some overlap in their effects on the response variables. However, the unique variances of immorality and injustice are sufficiently large ro warrant treating them as separate appraisal dimensions.
The interrelations between justice and morality, and.the common-and distinct
elements of the two concepts, have not received much attention thus far (see Furby, 1986 , for one of the few exceptions). Morality is clearly the mpre broad and inclusive of the two concepts, and justice is one among other moral standards (Cohen, 1986) . The interrelation between the two concepts is an issue that needs to be more systematically addressed in the future, both conceptually and in empirical research.
Perceived Injustice and Reaction Characteristics
-----
Independent
of the specific quality of the ensuing emotion, the perception of unfairness in the emotionantecedent appraisal se-ems to have a powerful link with the nature of the emotional reaction, particularly with the subjective feeling state and with the sociorelational consequences of the emotion. On one hand, this finding is important for research in the area of the social psychology of justice: It indicates that treatment or events considered as unjust are among the most powerful elicitors of intense emotions, assuming that the experience-based approach of the present intercultural study is likely to provide a representative sampling of some of the most probable emotion elicitors. For theory and research in the tradition of appraisal theories of emotion, the finding is important because it elucidates one of the likely factors involved in determining the relative intensity of emotional reactions, a topic that has proven quite elusive so far (see Frijda, Ortony, Sonnemans, & Clore, 1992) .
The fact that the links of perceived injustice were most pronounced with subjective feeling is of great interest for emotion psychology in general. Proprioceptive feedback theories would argue that intensity of feeling should be strongly affected by physiological arousal and highly expressive motorbehavior (Buck, 1980; Cappella, 1993; Laird & Bresler, 1992) . The present evidence suggeststhe opposite. Even though the causal relationship _£~~-()_t..be <:.~tab!!she~."'i~_o~_data.!.~~j~~ti~<:. attribution strongly affects intensity and duration of feeling,-Withmuch less of an effect on the other components of emotion. Such a result is more easily explained by theories claiming that subjective feeling consists of an integrated reflection or mirror image of all components of emotion in some kind of a monitor system, including, in particular, the cognitive appraisal patterns (Scherer, 1984 (Scherer, , 1993 . Although the proprioceptive feedback of emotion-related physiological arousal or patterns of muscular innervation is one aspect of reflection, the relative strength of the representation in conscious feeling of the various. components in the emotion process (changes in the autonomous or somatic nervous systems, changes in moti~~tion, cognitive processes as reflected in central nervous system actiVity) may vary. The results from this study suggest that in the case of injustice appraisal, a cognitive bias representing the fact ofhaving been treated unjustly may playa more prominent role than do the associated physiological and expressive reactions. The possibly disproportionate roles of the different emotion components in feeling in different conditions and types of events would seem worthy of further study.
The strong correlation of injustice appraisal and perceived negative effects on relationships makes sense if one considers judgments of injustice as an instance of blaming (see Mikula, 1993; Montada, 1991) . According to this view, injustice appraisals follow from (a) believing that somebody's entitlement has been violated and (b) attributing responsibility and blame for this fact to some other agents than the person affected. Linked to the increased tendency to assign external causation, the perception of unjust treatment by a significant other is very likely to lead to deterioration of the relationship with that person. (Disagreements between victims and perpetrators views about whether an injustice h~oc-curred can further impair the relationship; see Mikula, 1994; Mikula, Athenstaedt, Heschgl, & Heimgartner, in press. ) Are the Correlations Independent of Other Appraisal Variabks '! An important issue for further research is furnished by the question of whether increased intensity of emotional reaction is a direct effect of perceived injustice or whether it is mediated by other appraisal factors. In other words, if situations of perceived injustice are also appraised as being more pertinent to one's aims and/or control or coping ability judged as relatively lower," the intensity of the ensuing reaction may be also affected by these appraisals.
(In fact, perceived pertinence, relevance, or impact of the consequence of an event might be the most important determinants of intensity.) The data from-this-study, showing that perceived injustice-is -----significantly related to many other appraisal variables (being associated in each case with more extreme appraisals), raises the possibility that the effect of injustice on emotional intensity is fully or partly mediated by corresponding differences in these other appraisal variables. However, the results of the regression analyses show that this is true only to a very small degree. -In general, the relationship between perceived injustice and emotional reaction seems to be independent of other appraisal dimensions, which; of course, increases the interest of studying the unfairness dimension as a major factor in emotion-antecedent appraisal. Nevertheless, given theI'eu-ospective nature of the appraisal ratings, we cannot rule out the possibility that halo effects are also involved and that any final conclusion must await studies in which appraisal factors are obtained in an PERSONALTIY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN component of the multicomponential emotion episode: The reflection of the changes in all other components, such as changes in the autonomous nervous system or motor expression.
3. A problem of missing data arose because in Hofstedes (1980) original research, v.i1uesfor only 24 of the 37 counuies were reported. For the reasons described previously, it was decided to replace the missing values for individualism by the means for the respective geopolitical regions (except in the case of China in which it was decided to use the value obtained for Hong Kong). Because Hofstede had not studied any of the counuies in Africa contained in our sample, we decided to use the mean value for Latin America for all African counuies. In essence, this results in a low individualism score for the African counuies, which seems quite defensible (see Triandis, 1994) . 4. A data bank containing all of the situations obtained as well as the quantitative data will be shortly available through a study group of CERE (Coordination Europeenne de la Rechercher sur les Emotions). The data bank, financed by the Thyssen Foundation and the Maison des Sciences de I'Homme in Paris, will be available to all interested scholars. Information can be obtained from Harald WallOOtt at the University of Salzburg (e-mail: harald.wa1IOOtt@sbg.ac.at).
